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Chapter 1
The European Social Union: how to piece it together
Maurizio Ferrera
Introduction1
Over the last decade, ‘Social Europe’ has followed a U-shaped trajectory. In 2009, the 
Lisbon Treaty assigned clear and ambitious objectives to the Union: social progress, 
full employment, a high level of protection, inclusion and non-discrimination, social 
justice, equality between women and men as well as solidarity between generations 
and the protection of children’s rights (Art. 3 TEU). Economic, social and territorial 
cohesion and solidarity among Member States were also explicitly referred to. Not all 
national constitutions are so explicit and exigent. Many observers in fact welcomed 
the Lisbon Treaty as the culmination of (and at the same time as a springboard for 
further strengthening) the long process of mutual opening up and convergence between 
Member States: an economically beneficial and at the same time socially and politically 
sustainable ‘coming together’ of European state-peoples. 
The financial crisis and the ensuing great recession brusquely halted this ‘conciliatory’ 
trajectory, resurrecting the logic of ‘socially frigid economism’ which had characterized 
earlier phases of European integration (Mancini 1988). Fiscal stability and market 
conformity have become the top priorities, underpinned by a new institutional 
framework based on strict supranational surveillance, discipline, conditionality and 
the threat of financial sanctions. Socio-economic convergence has given way to new 
divergences and antagonisms, opening a fault line between the creditor countries of the 
North (core Europe) and the debtor countries of the South (the so-called periphery). 
In the wake of the Eastern enlargements, growing tensions have emerged around the 
issue of free movement: more specifically, access to domestic labour markets and 
welfare benefits for other European Union (EU) nationals (not to speak of third country 
nationals). It was mainly due to this aspect that the integration process witnessed its 
first dramatic reversal: Brexit.
As the economic crisis started to subside, the developmental curve of Social Europe 
veered gradually upwards again. Over the last few years, supranational institutions 
and some national leaders (French President Emmanuel Macron especially) have 
inaugurated a new socially-friendly discourse. Some practical steps of reconciliatory 
politics and policy have been undertaken, for example through the Juncker Investment 
1. This chapter was written in the context of my ERC project REScEU - Reconciling Economic and Social Europe: 
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Plan (including the social realm), as well as greater ‘flexibility’ in the application of 
fiscal rules. The Commission has revamped its social agenda, culminating in November 
2017 with the official proclamation of the European Pillar of Social Rights (EPSR) at the 
Gothenburg Summit (see Sabato and Corti, this volume).
In this chapter I argue that, building on what is already in place, the time is ripe for 
seriously considering the establishment of a fully-fledged European Social Union (ESU). 
Section 1 briefly introduces this notion, its main mission and its internal structure. 
Section 2 discusses the possible role of the EPSR within an ESU, while Section 3 argues 
in favour of a strengthening of EU social citizenship, taking advantage of the EPSR. 
Section 4 addresses the thorny issue of how to strengthen pan-European solidarity. The 
Conclusion wraps up and outlines some possible scenarios for the future. 
1. The European Social Union: what’s in a name?
Contrary to the famous maxim of Roman emperor Justinian (nomina sunt consequentia 
rerum: names follow from the essence of things), contemporary social sciences argue 
that institutions are the product of an original act of naming, ‘creating’ novel collective 
meanings, symbols, goals, commitments and organizational forms (Douglas 1986; 
Searle 2010; March and Olsen 1989). Only after a name has been coined can the process 
of institutional development and differentiation run its full course. The new ‘entity’ is 
provided with clear empirical referents (e.g. a target group, a set of policy tools, an 
organizational and legal scaffolding) and with practical resources to impact on social 
reality. Apart from their names, few elements of new institutions are entirely ‘new’ at 
the time of birth. What typically happens is a gradual and creative re-assemblage of 
diverse institutional pieces already available in the pertinent context. Such creative re-
assemblage changes the Gestalt (the form of perception and representation) of the pre-
existing elements and the logic of their functioning, setting them on a new synergic 
course. 
By re-naming the European Community a European Union and declaring the birth of the 
Economic and Monetary Union, the Maastricht Treaty, in the early 1990s, kick-started 
a quantum leap in the process of political and economic integration which is still under 
way. Social policy issues were however for the most part relegated to a Social Protocol, 
while the public debate continued to use the rather ambiguous term ‘Social Europe’, a 
term unfortunately not designating a definite institutional entity – as is also the case 
with the similarly vague notion of the European Social Model. These ‘names’ are not fit 
for purpose, as they lump together the horizontal dimension (‘le social dans l’Europe’) 
and the vertical dimension (‘l’Europe dans le social’) of social protection without 
clarifying their mutual connection and interdependence, their division of labour and 
potential synergies and, last but not least, without outlining a comprehensive system 
of governance. The reconciliation of the economic and social aspects of European 
integration must involve a far-sighted initiative of linguistic and symbolic innovation as 
a precondition for institution-building. We have an Economic and Monetary Union. We 
must pronounce the birth of a fully-fledged institutional counterpart: a European Social 
Union (ESU). The year 2017 sealed the adoption of the European Pillar of Social Rights 
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(EPSR), an important and valuable step forward, but not enough. We need an ESU as a 
wider container, certainly comprising the EPSR, but not coterminous with it. 
In the intellectual realm, the ESU already ‘exists’. The name was originally launched by 
Frank Vandenbroucke (2013) and its substance was further detailed in the context of the 
High-Level Group set up by Friends of Europe (Vandenbroucke with Vanhercke 2014). 
In recent years, the notion of an ESU has become the subject of a vibrant intellectual 
debate (Vandenbroucke et al. 2017), acquiring the status of a unifying policy concept 
encompassing the earlier and more limited concept of social investment (Hemerijck and 
Vandenbroucke 2012). It is now time to fill this expression with recognizable empirical 
contents. I suggest that we already have a sufficient set of ingredients to start the re-
assembling process and thus move from the symbolic to the policy realm. 
Here is a tentative list of such ingredients:
— the ensemble of social protection systems of the Member States, all based on 
the common traditions of a ‘social market economy’ and ‘social dialogue’, but 
characterized by notable differences in their specific schemes and institutions, in 
their logics of market-correcting, and the ranges of risks covered. National systems 
are also internally differentiated, as revealed by the growing profusion of social 
initiatives and programmes at regional and local levels (Halvorsen and Hvinden 
2016). Since their key feature – in the context of our discussion – is the close link 
between social protection institutions and domestic territories and jurisdictions, 
we can define this component as the National Social Spaces;
— the ensemble of social schemes and policies characterized by a cross-border 
element. Most of these initiatives involve regions, under the legal umbrella of 
European territorial cooperation. But another interesting development on this 
front is the creation (mainly by the social partners) of cross-border occupational 
insurance schemes for pensions and health care benefits. This component may be 
called Transnational Social Spaces; 
— the novel membership space – coterminous with the EU external borders – within 
which all bearers of EU citizenship enjoy a common ‘title’ bestowed upon them 
by the Union in order to access the benefits and services of the place in which 
they choose to settle. From the 1970s onwards, the EU has had a structured legal 
framework for the coordination of Member State social security systems, and 
since 2011 a directive regulates the cross-border mobility of patients in the field of 
healthcare. Let us define this component as the EU Mobility Space;
— the ensemble of those supranational policies with an explicit social purpose, be 
they of a regulative or (re)distributive nature, directly funded by the EU budget (if 
they imply spending) and based on either hard or soft law. This component is the 
EU Social Policy in its proper sense;
— the set of objectives of a social nature contained in the Lisbon Treaty, including 
those that allocate responsibilities between levels of government and define 
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decision-making procedures in this field. Given the supremacy of EU law over 
national law, such objectives and rules constitute the general framework guiding 
the other four components. We can call this component the EU fundamental 
social principles.
The five components are all in place and in flux. They obviously are not on an equal 
standing, and national social spaces will keep their predominant role for a long time to 
come. We know however that integration has made their boundaries more porous and 
flexible, their policies more adaptive to interaction and coordination dynamics, more 
plastic at the margins of innovation and experimentation. Prior to the crisis, an overall 
process of mutual hybridization and at least partial convergence was clearly under way – 
slow-moving, but likely to have a systemic impact (Hemerijck 2013). The current decade 
has largely reversed this trend (Andor 2017; Palier et al. 2018). Thus, the challenge 
today is to rescue convergence by enhancing overall steering capacities, so that the five 
components can be made to work in sync, with mutual reinforcements. Addressing this 
challenge also implies rethinking the relationship between an ESU and the Economic 
and Monetary Union (EMU), in order to limit reciprocal negative externalities. If this 
process is to be steered according to EU fundamental social principles, then we need 
to devise a broad ESU template capable of sustaining two different types of solidarity: 
a pan-European solidarity between countries (and all individual EU citizens as such) 
centred on supranational institutions, and more traditional forms of national solidarity 
centred on domestic (and regional/local) institutions. 
An ESU would be something very different from a federal welfare state as found in the 
so-called historical federations (such as the United States and Switzerland) (Obinger et 
al. 2005), in which the process of bottom-up unification took place at a time when the 
constituent units had barely started to address social problems. Although with some 
delay compared to unitary states, central authorities were thus able to standardize 
and/or establish ex novo federal social schemes and programmes. The construction of 
a European Social Union would take place within an entirely different developmental 
context, i.e. against the backdrop of extensive nation-based welfare states. This 
historical fact sets objective limits to ambitious forms of supra-nationalization, as 
already predicted by Stein Rokkan many years ago (Ferrera 2019). Thus, an ESU would 
represent an unprecedented ‘coming-together’ process involving already existing 
welfare states, allowed to maintain their ‘legitimate diversity’ (Scharpf 2002), but 
(i) committed to mutual adaptation based on jointly defined criteria and (ii) open to 
engage to a certain extent in risk-pooling. The fact that the EU has its own budget, 
fed by semi-automatic contributions and ‘own resources’ already sets it apart from 
any other type of multi-state regional organization, implicitly signalling the presence 
of a modicum of social federalism – based on inter-territorial transfers – within its 
institutional architecture. But compared to the historical federations, ESU-building will 
be a novel adventure of large-scale institutional experimentation. 
Anton Hemerijck has dubbed ESU a ‘holding environment’ (Hemerijck 2013), i.e. 
‘a zone of resilience based on shared values and a common purpose, matched by 
competent institutions, in times of painful adaptation. The function of a “holding 
environment” is to mitigate stress and thereby uphold the integrity of national welfare 
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states, but also to maintain pressure to mobilize rather than overwhelm domestic 
reforms with only disciplinary intrusion’. Stemming from child neuro-psychiatry 
(Wincott 1964), the ‘holding environment’ concept has been subsequently elaborated 
by management sciences. For the latter, a holding environment is ‘a social system that 
serves to keep people engaged with one another in spite of the divisive forces generated 
by adaptive work’ (Heifetz et al. 2009: 305). Resting on a mix of collective safety and 
mutual collaboration, on the one hand, but also systemic pressures to engage with 
policy problems and institutional recalibration, the ‘holding environment’ concept has 
indeed high analytical and symbolic potential in the context of our ESU discussion. 
The challenge is how to fill it with empirical content, building – as I propose – on those 
institutional components which are already available. 
The word ‘environment’ evokes a notion already used above: ‘space’. An ESU would 
be a political and institutional space (more precisely, a meta-space), in two senses. 
First, and obviously, it would be a territorial space, including all Member States and 
their citizens/residents, and with an outer border coterminous with the EU frontiers. 
Territorial closure is a necessary feature for organized collective sharing and solidarity: 
defining a ‘who’ comes prior to any discussion about ‘whats’ and ‘hows’ (Ferrera 2005). 
Second, an ESU would be a membership space, tying its participants to the respect 
of common values, the pursuit of common objectives and compliance with rights and 
obligations in a wide sense. As with the EMU, without prejudice to the fundamental 
social principles, the rules of mobility and the social acquis, an ESU could provide for 
some margins of membership differentiation, based on opt-in and opt-out clauses. Each 
Member State would preserve the core elements of its social protection tradition and 
design, taking advantage of the opportunities offered by those EU social measures for 
which it qualifies, engaging in EU-supported/regulated transnational social initiatives 
and, last but not least, sharing the burdens of ESU membership.
By providing a new institutional assemblage and a new Gestalt, ESU could overcome the 
ambiguities of Social Europe. In the first place, it would clarify once and for all (hopefully) 
that an integrative European social protection (and the underlying normative objectives 
of ‘solidarity’ and ‘social justice’) has at least three distinct dimensions: national, trans-
national and supranational. While these dimensions have the potential to clash with 
each other, this is not inevitable, provided they are properly recognized as such and 
deliberately reconciled. Secondly, and as a consequence of this, an ESU would be based 
on the premise that social protection must move towards a multi-level architecture, 
allowing for a network (rather than a hierarchy) of links among the five components and 
favouring synergies and mutual adjustments. While the internal interlinkages of an ESU 
is obviously key to its success, its construction must not lose sight of inter-institutional 
relations, so to speak. As mentioned, if an ESU is to become the counterpart of the EMU 
within the overall EU framework, the two Unions must gradually come to terms with 
each other, in a logic of ‘institutional complementarity’. 
In what direction should the creative re-assemblage of the five components proceed? 
Answering this question requires demanding exercises of political and institutional 
imagination. What is needed are both grand visions and circumstantial policy ideas to 
serve as seeds or wedges for change. It took about two decades – the 1970s and 1980s – to 
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generate, by trial and error, a detailed and consensual blueprint for the EMU. The design 
of this blueprint ran parallel with policy experimentations and incremental innovations 
(e.g. the monetary ‘snake’ of the Seventies, followed by the European Monetary System 
in 1979). Even though we have a ‘name’ which is fit for purpose, ESU construction has 
just made its first steps in the intellectual realm – yet only as a general aspiration. Even a 
brief inventory of the potential building blocks currently available would fall way beyond 
the scope of this chapter. Let me however make some remarks about two components 
which are of special interest for this volume: EU social policy and the EU mobility space. 
In 2017 the former witnessed, as noted, a highly significant institutional innovation: the 
EPSR. In the wake of Brexit, the latter has in turn become a highly contested issue. It 
thus seems more than reasonable to start from here.
2. The European Pillar of Social Rights: an operational arm of  
 fundamental social principles?
Architectural metaphors have accompanied European integration since its very 
beginning. Already in 1948, the West European Union was described as a ‘cornerstone’ 
for post-war reconstruction. The pillar metaphor made its appearance in the 1980s – 
again in reference to defence cooperation – and then became a semi-official symbol for 
illustrating the reformed ‘three-pillar’ structure of the EU after Maastricht. European 
Commission President Juncker spoke of an EPSR for the first time in his State of 
the Union speech of 2015. In April 2017, the Pillar was the subject of a Commission 
Recommendation, later jointly signed by the European Parliament, the Council and the 
Commission. 
What role can the EPSR play within the context of a wider European Social Union? 
The key ingredient (and also the most politically appealing) of the new expression is 
that of ‘European rights’. The legal status of the EPSR is, however, ambiguous. The 
text speaks about ‘principles and rights’, specifying that the Pillar reaffirms some of 
the rights already present in the Union’s acquis and that it also adds new principles, 
which however require dedicated measures or legislation in order to become legally 
enforceable. This ambiguity has led some commentators to consider the new initiative 
as mere phrase-mongering (see Sabato and Vanhercke 2017 for a review of positions). 
This judgement is however too hasty. To gauge the significance of the EPSR and its 
potential in respect of ESU, some conceptual clarifications are needed.
What exactly are ‘rights’? Following the tradition of Max Weber, we can define rights 
as sources of power (‘Machtquellen’). There are three distinct types of resources which 
back the actual exercise of any right. First, there are normative resources. Holding a 
right means having legitimate reason to claim compliance by others: horizontally 
from fellow citizens (e.g. non-discrimination in the workplace) and vertically from 
political authorities (e.g. fair treatment by social administrations). Secondly, there are 
enforcement resources: if compliance is not obtained, the right-holder can activate 
legal coercion. Thirdly, there are instrumental resources: the availability of practical 
conditions for the full exercise of a right. In the case of social entitlements, for 
example, the state sets up social insurance systems and networks of public services, 
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provides information, advice, procedures for accessing and delivering benefits and so 
on. While the second type of resources (enforcement) is what makes rights (and, by 
extension, citizenship) ‘hard’, in contemporary liberal-democratic societies we should 
not underestimate the importance of the other two types: normative and especially 
instrumental resources. The former operate at the ideational and motivational level, 
while the latter facilitate the actualization of rights. In addition, both may play a role in 
the process of rights adjudication in courts of law. 
We know that even when it adopts binding norms that indirectly impinge on national 
citizenship, the EU cannot provide enforcement resources directly to citizens. The EU 
does however provide normative resources (if only through soft law) and, in particular, 
instrumental resources. I suggest that the main role of the EPSR in terms of citizen 
empowerment could and should result, initially, from its capacity to exploit in a coherent 
and systematic way its motivational and actualization potentials. 
The EU already offers a wide array of programmes and services facilitating the exercise 
of social rights legislated by supranational, national and even subnational authorities. 
Many programmes underpin intra-EU mobility (e.g. EURES, ERASMUS and EHIC), 
while others make possible, complement and strengthen national initiatives, e.g. 
through the Structural and Cohesion Funds, some sector-specific funds – such as the 
European Globalisation Adjustment Fund (EGF)2 or the Fund for Aid to Deprived People 
(FEAD)3 – or dedicated initiatives such as the Youth Guarantee. The added value of the 
EPSR should be that it acts as a broad framework capable of linking, enhancing and 
expanding such types of initiatives as instruments for the actualization of the Pillar’s 
rights, leveraging the ideational and motivational power of its normative principles. The 
recent proposal – explicitly linked to the EPSR – for a Regulation for the establishment 
of a European Labour Authority (ELA) is a good illustration of the way in which the 
Pillar can take on form at grass-roots level. 
In the ESU context, the EPSR could thus be seen as a sort of intermediary between the 
EU fundamental social principles, on the one hand, and all the other ESU components, 
on the other. In its preamble, the Pillar makes explicit and detailed reference to the 
pertinent articles of the Treaties, with Art. 12 stating that:
‘The aim of the European Pillar of Social Rights is to serve as a guide towards 
efficient employment and social outcomes when responding to current and 
future challenges which are directly aimed at fulfilling people’s essential 
needs, and towards ensuring better enactment and implementation of social 
rights’. 
2. The European Globalisation Adjustment Fund was established in 2006 to provide support to people losing 
their jobs as a result of major structural changes in world trade patterns due to globalisation, e.g. when a large 
company shuts down or production is moved outside the EU, or as a result of the global economic and financial 
crisis.
3. The Fund for European Aid to the Most Deprived (FEAD) was established in 2014 to support Member State 
measures of material assistance to the most deprived, accompanied by social inclusion measures (Madama 
2016). 
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In this formulation, the EPSR’s ‘guiding’ purpose nicely relates to the above-mentioned 
ideational and motivational dimension, while the purpose of ‘ensuring enactment and 
implementation’ relates in turn to the facilitation and actualization dimension. In other 
words, if appropriately and strategically exploited and despite its soft character, the 
EPSR could play an important role within a future ESU. Even prior to that, it could 
already start to pave the way for its eventual establishment. 
3. Movers and stayers: reconfiguring EU citizenship
The reference to ‘rights’ explicitly connects the Pillar to the language of citizenship and 
social entitlements which has become so culturally and institutionally entrenched in the 
European tradition. In 1992 the Maastricht Treaty created an unprecedented form of 
supranational citizenship, transforming nationals into multi-level citizens whose rights, 
duties and political memberships are determined not only by their state, but also by 
a political union of which their state is a member (Bauböck 2017). EU citizenship has 
often been characterized as mere ‘market citizenship’ (Shuibhne 2010): the most visible 
and tangible rights (in the hard sense) are in fact those of free movement. As already 
mentioned, the crisis has brought to the fore a growing tension around the issue of free 
movement within the mobility space (for a debate: Ferrera and Bauböck 2017). In various 
Member States, Brexit has sparked harsh controversies about who should be entitled to 
access national labour markets and social protection systems. While the main targets of 
public debates have been refugees and, more generally, economic migrants from third 
countries, contention has also arisen over the rights of EU nationals when moving within 
the Union. The academic debate has shown that resentment against non-nationals is 
more widespread among the so-called ‘stayers’, i.e. citizens who do not take advantage 
of free movement. Instigated by right-wing populist parties, large segments of the latter 
now blame the EU for having forced Member States to surrender their prerogatives of 
border control and of giving precedence to nationals (Ferrera and Pellegata 2017). Since 
EU citizenship is precisely what entitles free entry into, and non-discrimination within 
the domestic labour market and welfare system of any Member State, it runs the risk of 
eliciting rancour and enmity instead of mutual bonds and recognition.
In principle, there are three strategies for responding to the growing tension between 
stayers and movers (Van Parijs 2017). The first can be dubbed as the ‘all movers’ strategy 
and would consist in converting as many stay-at-homes as possible into movers. Since 
total conversion would obviously be impossible, let us say that such a strategy would 
involve persuading the stayers to internalize the functional and normative rationales 
of mobility as a collective benefit. But, as mentioned, empirical evidence tells us that 
an increasing number of stayers do not (or no longer) buy into that view. Thus the ‘all 
movers’ strategy is no solution, but instead risks aggravating the political problem. The 
second strategy is ‘retreat’, i.e. curtailing those elements of free movement rights that 
cause the problem. There is certainly room for some steps in this direction: for example, 
some limits could be placed on the constantly increasing judicialisation of EU citizenship 
(Schmidt 2017). The mobility regime can be partially reconfigured to make it more 
restrictive through secondary legislation alone, i.e. without needing to change the Treaty. 
There is however a third strategy, which can be dubbed as ‘Caring Europe’ – a term first 
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submitted to EU leaders in exactly this wording by a group of scholars during the UK 
presidency of the EU in 2005 under Tony Blair (Giddens 2006). How exactly might this 
latter strategy be pursued in the present situation – and more generally in the context of 
the ESU project? In line with the reasoning proposed above, the starting point should be 
a creative reconfiguration of what is already in place. There is already a profusion of EU-
related (sponsored, co-funded, directly managed by the EU) initiatives that cater mainly 
to the stayers. They are currently dispersed, not linked to a single symbolic umbrella, and 
often not even perceived as having a significant EU component. In the delivery process at 
local level, there is a risk of this component remaining hidden from the eyes of final users 
(Madama 2017). 
The two above-mentioned EU funds already target stayers. The EGF was introduced 
precisely to compensate national/resident workers for the negative employment effects 
of economic ‘opening’; in its turn, the FEAD was established to respond to the social shocks 
caused by the euro-crisis and the great recession. A substantial increase of resources 
for these two funds, accompanied by focused communication and popularization 
initiatives, would certainly be a move in the right direction. Another possibility could 
be to integrate into a single ‘EU guarantee’ scheme the Youth Guarantee scheme (never 
fully implemented: Andor and Vésely 2018) and two other schemes currently under 
discussion within the Commission: the Skills Guarantee and Child Guarantee (Council 
of the European Union 2016; European Commission 2017). Such a single guarantee 
scheme could operate by means of a voucher to be spent on services. The European 
Social Fund (ESF) has already experimented with similar schemes at local level, for 
example in the region of Lombardy where the EU co-funds an ‘Employment Unified 
Endowment’ (‘Dote Unica Lavoro’) consisting of a cash transfer and a voucher for 
training and re-insertion services. Lombard citizens seem aware of the fact that the EU 
is involved (ESF 2017). But more can certainly be done to enhance the visibility – and 
thus the legitimation – of such schemes, even in regions such as Lombardy which have 
gone some way to achieving this.
A recent ambitious proposal – the so-called Prodi-Sautter Plan – could even break new 
ground in empowering the stayers (Fransen et al. 2018). The plan outlines a broad 
roadmap for boosting investment in social infrastructure, under the coordination of the 
EU. The objective is to mobilize public and private resources to fill the investment gaps 
in fields such as education and training (childcare facilities, schools, universities, training 
establishments), health and long-term care (hospitals, medical technologies, elderly care) 
and affordable housing. The EU has traditionally promoted and supported vast economic 
infrastructures for transport, telecommunications and energy, upholding free movement 
and intra-EU trade. It is now time to provide equivalent support to infrastructures catering 
for the social needs of local territories and communities – i.e. where the stayers live. It 
is interesting (and refreshing) to note that the Prodi-Sautter Report clearly identifies not 
only the functional, but also the political mission of the plan, i.e. its capacity to make the 
EU more ‘caring’, with tangible benefits at the grassroots level. 
In order to make all stayers aware of the broad (and hopefully increasing) set of EU-
related support measures – including those potentially arising from the Prodi-Sautter 
initiative – a smart move would be to introduce a practical tool capable of making 
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citizens/residents more aware of (and also easing access to) such support. One idea 
is the introduction of an ‘EU social card’, available to all European citizens. This card 
could integrate into a single document all already-existing (or envisaged) cards: the EU 
Health Insurance Card (EHIC), the European Student Card and the EU Disability Card. 
A single card would become a tangible good, with a high symbolic potential, capable of 
fostering collective identities, we-feeling sentiments, and membership perceptions. This 
proposal goes beyond the planned introduction of a European Social Security Number, 
as it would include the ‘stayers’ and not only the ‘movers’. In this regard, it is closer to 
the idea of an ‘EU social security card’, launched by the European Parliament. However, 
it would be even more ambitious, as it explicitly serves not only administrative purposes 
(i.e. informing citizens about their rights) but also political objectives (enhancing 
citizenship-mediated identity and legitimation).
The emphasis on instrumental resources facilitating the exercise of social rights may 
seem unambitious and low-key, but they have the advantage of being practical and can 
become operative without Treaty changes or major legislative innovations. Given the 
weighty legacy and inertia of national regimes, incrementalism is the most promising 
policy strategy for the EU today for achieving short- and medium-term results – and this 
holds true also for the implementation of the EPSR and the creation of ESU – provided 
that both remain firmly anchored in a broad and ambitious vision of the future. 
4. Pan-European solidarity: the hardest nut to crack
There is agreement in the ESU debate that it should rest on two types of solidarity, 
guided by different criteria: pan-European solidarity between countries and between 
individual EU citizens, centred on supranational institutions; and the more traditional 
forms of national solidarity, centred on domestic (and regional/local) institutions. 
Always very delicate, the issue of Pan-European solidarity has become even thornier 
in the wake of the crisis. Academic discussions on this topic have mainly concentrated 
and rested on either normative or functional arguments. The former defend (or reject) 
the principled desirability of cross-national solidarity, given the deep network of ties 
now linking the Member States. The latter try to establish whether the Monetary Union 
and the Single Market, in order to function properly (i.e. efficiently and effectively), 
require a number of ‘social corollaries’ implying some risk-pooling and the presence 
of some market-correcting and centralized ‘visible hand’ (Vandenbroucke 2017). Both 
types of arguments acknowledge the ultimate political nature of pan-EU solidarity by 
underlining the need for consensus and common will by national governments. But 
they fall short of spelling out which exactly are the political obstacles to institutional 
change and how they might be overcome. Even prior to this, normative and functional 
discussions skirt a more fundamental question: what would be the political implications 
of an ESU? Is it possible to outline a free-standing political justification of this proposal? 
A tenet of political theory in all its variants is that a territorially organized collectivity 
cannot survive and prosper without the diffuse support of its members, i.e. a set of 
general and positive evaluative orientations towards the collectivity as such and its 
authority structure, providing diffuse support capable of motivating compliance 
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beyond self-interest. Historically, organized solidarity has played a key role in political 
legitimation by nurturing positive feelings about the effectiveness and fairness of the 
territorial government. Just like external security and internal peace, the welfare state 
has gradually established itself as a basic political good, i.e. an instrument serving the 
purpose of facilitating social cooperation, managing conflicts, sustaining generalized 
compliance and thus, ultimately, ‘keeping the polity together’. There can be little doubt 
that the EU and the Monetary Union are currently suffering from a legitimacy crisis: 
populist parties are not just questioning EU policies but are challenging the EU polity as 
such – and Brexit is going to tear apart an important piece of the latter. To what extent 
can we conceive an ESU (and specifically, its pan-European solidarity component) 
as an instrument for re-legitimizing the EU and thus as an antidote against political 
centrifugation? 
The answer must come in two steps. As mentioned above, legitimation does not hinge 
on specific support, i.e. interest-based approval of contingent functional performance, 
but on overall output performance. A basic social norm in contemporary democracies is 
that institutions and public policies must abide by a logic of instrumental effectiveness 
in respect of voters’ needs and aspirations. In the eyes of a significant number of citizens 
and parties, the problem with the EU is, precisely, that ‘it does not work’, that it is 
out of sync with popular demands and needs. The functional justification for an ESU 
(specifically: the introduction of certain EU-level automatic stabilizers) is precisely that 
it is necessary for re-establishing the effective performance of the Monetary Union and 
the Single Market. An ESU’s contribution to such re-establishment would thereby also 
operate ipso facto as a vehicle for politically re-legitimizing and re-stabilizing the EU 
polity. Though analytically distinct, the political justification for ESU would rest on the 
shoulders of functional performance. 
Diffuse support rests however not only on effectiveness, but also on fairness. Citizens 
must feel that the territorial government abides by the general norm of somehow 
representing the collective interest, taking care of all sectors/strata of the population, 
however weak and peripheral. One of the arguments voiced by Eurosceptics is precisely 
that the Union does not represent collective interests and does not rule by norms of 
fairness. Note that, in the political argument, what matters are not general conceptions 
of the common good or distributive justice, but the empirical presence of widely shared 
beliefs that the government (the EU) is indeed credibly inspired by norms of fairness. 
The Caring Europe strategy illustrated above would aim precisely at (re)activating 
such beliefs by explicitly and deliberately implementing the fundamental EU social 
principles, enhancing EU social policies and making them more visible to citizens – 
whether movers or stayers. Alongside the fairness dimension, the political justification 
becomes free-standing in respect of both normative and functional arguments.
One possible objection is that in the current situation the proposal for (let alone the 
construction of) a more solidaristic EU would aggravate the legitimation problem 
rather than solving it. Any move towards a ‘Transfer Union’ would in fact increase and 
embitter existing political conflicts around the EU. To the extent that it is genuinely 
political (and not functional or normative in disguise), this objection must be broken 
down into two distinct propositions: 1) the EU lacks the cultural preconditions (in a 
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very broad sense) for a strategy of political legitimation involving any significant form 
of organized collective solidarity; 2) given the extant conflict constellation and the rise 
of Euroscepticism, no step in this direction is politically feasible. Both propositions rest 
more or less explicitly on the hypothesis that there has been a clear shift from ‘permissive 
consensus’ to ‘constraining dissensus’ within national public opinions, emblematically 
represented by the rise of Euroscepticism (Hooghe and Marks 2009). Though obviously 
empirically grounded, the constraining dissensus argument has two limits. First, by 
focusing on the public opinion side, it soft-pedals the role played by the elite (including 
mainstream elites) in having prepared a fertile terrain for the voters’ dissensus. Second, 
it tends to overestimate the extent and depth of such dissensus. Both points are key 
for a realistic political justification. It may well be the case that the legitimation crisis 
has resulted from elite choices and mistakes, thus being largely self-inflected. And it 
might equally be the case that there might be more cultural predispositions for a Caring 
Europe than meet the critic’s eyes.
An increasing body of empirical data seems to support the latter hypothesis. A mass survey 
conducted in autumn 2016 in the context of the EU-funded REScEU project (Ferrera 
and Pellegata 2017), shows that wide majorities of citizens would indeed favour steps in 
this direction, including in Germany. Popular support for a larger EU budget aimed at 
promoting economic and social investments, for helping people in severe poverty and 
for providing financial help to Member States experiencing a rise in unemployment has 
majority support in all of the six countries covered by the survey: Spain, France, Italy, 
Germany, Sweden and Poland. Results have been confirmed by a similar survey covering 
also Austria, Cyprus, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal and Slovakia 
(Gerhards et al. 2018) and by a more recent YouGov survey (Genschel and Hemerijck 
2018). Obviously, surveys must be treated with care, as they only provide snapshots of 
attitudes at one particular moment and we know that attitudes are volatile. Mover, they 
indicate citizens’ preferences, but not necessarily their saliency in voting behaviour. 
Finally, responses are sensitive to the way in which issues are framed and formulated. 
For these reasons, surveys only register contingent ‘value expressions’, not necessarily 
indicative of genuine value judgements and of a stable and internalised collective moral 
order. But these limitations should not be overrated. The fact that attitudes may easily 
change means in fact that that they are plastic and thus amenable to cuing on the part 
of elites, through issue-framing and discourse. And it cannot be assumed a priori that 
value expressions are entirely devoid of internal and stable commitments. 
On this basis, it can be suggested that a ‘silent majority’ seems to be potentially available 
for supporting a strategy of realignment between the deep de facto interdependences 
created by the EMU, on the one hand, and the EU’s institutional and symbolic 
architecture, on the other. The absence of such a strategy represents a clear failure of 
European political elites. As mentioned above, elective (choice-based) partnerships 
based on forward-looking objectives turn onto fully-fledged families of nations 
to the extent that their leaders engage in some fraternal nudging. The exercise of 
‘socioemotional leadership’, capable of developing a collective fraternal idioculture has 
become difficult in a world increasingly based on fluid social relationships, self-seeking 
behaviours and rational-legal authority (Brint 2001). But the EMU elite has made great 
steps in the opposite direction, emphasising difference and apartness between national 
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communities and their governments, denigrating – also symbolically – any mechanism 
of mutual support, promoting a historically unprecedented rule-based formalization of 
political authority: almost a deliberate recipe for undermining the conditions of polity 
maintenance.
I mentioned above that the EU cannot develop into a fully-fledged federal welfare 
state. But it must at least establish a ‘holding environment’ for the safe functioning and 
adaptive flourishing of national welfare states. In my view, such an environment should 
also serve a ‘polity maintenance’ function, i.e. conceived and pursued with a view to 
safeguarding the Union’s survival and durability.
To some extent, the problem of forging and combining inter-territorial and inter-
group solidarity was already addressed during the historical process of welfare state-
building. National risk-pooling is the key pillar of institutionalized solidarity in the 
European tradition. The introduction of national (even if occupationally fragmented) 
compulsory social insurance is typically seen as the birth certificate of the welfare state 
as such (Alber 1982). In the historical federations, an important turning point was also 
the setting-up of federal mechanisms for ‘equalizing’ the fiscal resources of the various 
territorial units, initially, to ensure the local absorption of asymmetric shocks, later to 
compensate for geo-economic or socio-demographic disadvantages (Burgess 2005; 
Müller and Keil 2013). In both cases, polity-building motivations played a prominent 
role (Ferrera 1993). Outside the European context, one interesting experience is that of 
Canada – the only federal system which has explicitly created a ‘Social Union’ among 
its ten provinces (Fortin et al. 2003). As in the EU, the notion of a social union made 
its first appearance in intellectual and political debates during the second half of 20th 
century. To promote non-discrimination and equal opportunity and to safeguard 
mobility rights, the Canadian federation adopted a Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
in 1982 and then proceeded to (re)define national objectives and binding standards of 
service throughout the entire nation. In 1999, the provinces and the central government 
signed a Social Union Framework Agreement (SUFA). This not only confirmed and 
defined the rights and standards of all Canadians regardless of their residence (as does 
the EPSR), but also confirmed and re-regulated intergovernmental financial relations, 
including the co-financing by the central government of some provincially-administered 
social protection schemes as well as fiscal equalization measures. To some extent, the 
Canadian Social Union can be regarded, in other words, as a holding environment 
for ‘welfare provinces’ (‘le social dans le Canada’) on top of a certain number of pan-
Canadian schemes and fiscal transfers run directly from Ottawa (‘le Canada dans le 
social’). The implementation of SUFA – under changed macro-economic conditions - 
has experienced ups and downs, possibly providing political and institutional lessons 
for building ESU.
Several proposals to enhance cross-national economic solidarity are currently under 
discussion among EU leaders and institutions. Among the most ambitious are a 
common Eurozone budget to sustain economic and social convergence, possibly under 
the guidance of a dedicated EU Finance Minister, the expansion of the remit of the 
European Stability Fund – including the introduction of a dedicated credit line for 
asymmetric shocks – and an EU unemployment reinsurance fund. These innovations 
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are currently being discussed under the umbrella of EMU governance. By making 
the latter more transfer-oriented and socially friendly, they would create valuable 
institutional complementarities with an ESU, possibly even acting as bridges between 
the two. And with the passing of time, a strengthened ESU might be able to steer the 
functioning of these new instruments not only in accordance with a logic of economic 
effectiveness, but also of social fairness.
Conclusions
This chapter has argued strongly in favour of a fully-fledged European Social Union. Its 
formal establishment is of course merely presumptive and its functional and political 
effectiveness may well be disputable. Those who nurture more clamorous aspirations 
are likely to be disappointed, at least initially, as an ESU would not be much more than a 
formal re-assemblage of already-existing elements. But in politics a lot can be achieved 
through symbolic actions and small policy changes: a mere discourse about an ESU, 
an act of ‘naming’ and a smart packaging of its first measures could have a significant 
impact. 
We should also remember that national welfare states did not come about through big 
bangs: with a few exceptions, their beginnings were quite modest and it took a long 
time to build momentum. Institution-building resulted from social and political conflict 
around redistributive issues. Conflict dynamics served both to cement horizontal 
alliances among the disadvantaged and to promote vertical exchanges between rulers 
and the ruled. Solidarity and political justice became irreversibly intertwined through 
the democratic process. In the historical federations, claims of social justice intersected 
with claims of territorial justice. In some critical historical contingencies (the New 
Deal in America, World War II in Switzerland), big leaps forward in terms of both 
interpersonal social and inter-territorial solidarity resulted not only from bottom-up 
pressure from the workers’ movement, but also from a top-down logic, based on the 
interests/wishes of incumbent political authorities – local and federal – to preserve 
stability and consolidate polity in the face of acute functional challenges, social unrest or 
dire emergencies. One of the lessons from the above-mentioned Canadian Social Union 
experience is the key role played by central authorities and some provincial leaders in 
forging the political climate which made SUFA possible. 
The topic of political leadership has slipped into the background of EU studies. But 
without responsible and far-sighted leaders, institution-building – and in particular the 
creation of novel institutions – has little chance of success. The most vocal players in 
Europe’s political arenas seem now to be Eurosceptics and supporters of souverainisme. 
As mentioned, survey data reveals that there are large ‘silent majorities’ who still support 
EU membership and more integration, including more pan-European solidarity. It is to 
be hoped that such voters will be able to find suitable candidates in the run-up to the 
2019 European Parliament elections. While the latter will not be the last opportunity 
for establishing an ESU, it would certainly be a pity to miss it – and probably a huge 
political mistake. 
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